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Europe’s Policy Options
for Fighting the Illegal
Employment of
Migrant Workers
By Dr Katerina-Marina Kyrieri Dr Katerina-Marina Kyrieri Dr Katerina-Marina Kyrieri Dr Katerina-Marina Kyrieri Dr Katerina-Marina Kyrieri*
The issue of labour migration is becoming more prominent in policy debates as employers are
gradually more reliant on migrant workers from non-EU countries. The Commission’s legislative
proposal for a directive providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-
country nationals forms an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive and structural approach
towards effective migration management. Although the phenomenon of undeclared work is not
limited to migrants, the new legislation on sanctions against employers of such persons
presupposes that the chance to obtain work in the EU without the required legal status is a key
inducement to illegal immigration. Based on the premise that employer sanctions set the moral
tone for immigration policy at the workplace, this article intends to address one of the main
causes of illegal migration: the black labour market. The article highlights the importance of
having a harmonized EU framework for imposing sanctions against employers of irregular
migrants. It examines the scope of the draft directive and its features and evaluates national
legislation by means of the following considerations: 1) What is the national legislation as far
as sanctions of employers of illegal workers are concerned? 2) What kind of sanctions do they
provide? 3) Are these sanctions effective and efficient? 4) How the Commission proposal can
become successful in helping to remedy enforcement difficulties? 5) Which additional to
preventive measures can be taken to achieve the above policy objective? 6) What consequences
would the draft directive have on national legislation?
Background Background Background Background Background
Since the Council Recommendation of 27 September 1996
on combating the illegal employment of TCNs,3 the sensitive
issue of illegally employing third-country nationals has not
been discussed again in the Council.4 The Commission
adopted a Communication on illegal work in 1998 which
intended to initiate a debate in the Member States and
among social partners on the most appropriate strategy to
fight undeclared work, involving both EU citizens and
illegally resident TCNs. The current proposal makes it clear
that in order to address the problem of illegal immigration
comprehensively, the employment of illegal residents should
be put back on the political agenda.
The Draft Directive for sanctioning employers of irregular
workers builds on the Council Recommendation of 19965
by requiring Member States to prohibit illegal employment,
to provide for similar sanctions, to require employers to
undertake preventive measures and other controls and to
call upon the competent authorities to enforce those
measures effectively. This proposal is mostly concerned
with immigration policy, and not with labour or social policy
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Addressing illegal immigration has been a central part of
the European Union’s common immigration policy since its
inception in 1999. The Treaty of Amsterdam laid down the
Community’s competences in this field (Title IV), with Article
63(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(TEC) as the explicit basis for measures on illegal immigration
and illegal residence, including the repatriation of illegal
residents.
The proposal for a Directive providing for sanctions
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals
(TCNs)1 takes stock of the progress made in fighting illegal
immigration and forms part of the Union’s efforts to
develop a comprehensive migration policy. It also
complements the policy plan on legal migration adopted
by the Commission in December 2005 which states that
“the admission of economic immigrants is inseparable
from further measures to combat illegal immigration, in
order to ensure the integrity and credibility of such a
policy”.2www.eipa.eu
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The EU plans to bring an extra 20 million Asian and African workers into the Union in the next two decades.
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 A basic tenet of how the
European Union manages
illegal immigration is the
removal of incentives in the
destination countries.
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per se, entailing however some harmonisation at the EU
level of criminal law.
The proposal tries to strike a balance between mobility
of irregular migratory flows which regularly lead to human
tragedies, domestic stability and prevention. It takes into
account that a basic tenet of how the European Union
manages illegal immigration is the removal of incentives in
the destination countries. By tolerating the illegal
employment of TCNs, Member States stimulate emigration
and illegal residence. Con-
sidering also that employ-
ment is a key part of the
integration process, the
illegal status of migrant
workers makes it more
difficult for them to integrate
into the local community. It
blocks their access to services
and takes away their ability
to enforce their labour and
social rights.
The scale of the pheno-
menon is hard to quantify as precise figures are difficult to
obtain. Nevertheless, recent estimates of the number of
illegal migrants in the EU range between 4.5 and 8 million,
with an estimated increase by 350,000 to 500,000 per
year.6 Between 7-16% of the Union’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is estimated to come from the shadow
economy, although this is not entirely due to illegal migrants.7
Construction, agriculture, cleaning, hotel/catering and
textile industries are the main sectors which greatly involve
undocumented work in general and attract illegal migrants
in particular. It is not a coincidence that given the difficulties
in tolerating the sustained presence of significant numbers
of illegally residing TCNs in their territories, some Member
States (e.g. UK and the Netherlands) have initiated
regularisation programmes and others (e.g. Belgium,
France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) have undertaken
large-scale “fait accompli” regularisation.8 Some of them
have carried out single ‘one-shot’ measures (e.g. Greece)
whereas others have needed to carry out such measures
more frequently (e.g. Italy).
The fact that such regularisation takes place reveals the
existence of a dynamic hidden economy. Regularisation of
this kind is both politically and economically motivated. For
example, regularisations carried out in Spain and France
have actually been driven by employers, in recognition of
the fact that some sectors,
particularly domestic ser-
vices, have become depen-
dent on illegal labour and
therefore it is desirable to
bring them into the formal
economy.9 Large scale
regularisations have impli-
cations for many parts of
society since it is necessary
for governments to obtain
political support amongst
key actors (e.g. employers
and trade unions), whilst at the same time introducing
further measures to tackle illegal migration in order to
maintain public support.10
In reality, some level of illegal migration will always
persist in the EU. Yet, the fight against illegal immigration
must remain an essential part of migration management.
This may start with preventive measures and the suppression
of its incentives such as the possibility to carry out undeclared
work. The draft Directive complements the existing policy
aiming at transforming undeclared work into regular
employment, which is one of the main issues of the
Employment Strategy since 2001.11 Although its principal
focus is on employment and working conditions, it uses a
form of reinforced cooperation among different policies in
order to discourage illegal migration.EIPASCOPE 2008/3
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Main features of the proposal Main features of the proposal Main features of the proposal Main features of the proposal Main features of the proposal
The proposal contains a general prohibition on the
employment of TCNs who are illegally staying within the EU
territory. To ensure the effectiveness of this prohibition,
employers would be required before recruiting a TCN to
check that they have a residence permit or another
authorisation for stay valid for the period of employment
(Art. 4). Infringements would
be sanctioned by penalties
which may be administrative
in nature (Art. 8) consisting,
among others, of fines (e.g.
financial penalties for each
illegally employed TCN and
payments of return costs)
(Art. 6) as well as back
payments comprising outstanding remunerations, taxes,
social security contributions (Art. 7).
Businesses face a range of other punitive measures,
including exclusion from entitlements to public benefits,
aid, subsidies or participation in a public contract up to five
years, recovery of public subsidies if these were granted to
the employer during the 12 months preceding the detection
of illegal employment, temporary or permanent
disqualification from practice, placement under judicial
supervision and a judicial winding-up order (Art. 13).
Criminal penalties would be available in four serious
cases where: a) there has been a repetition of infringements
within a period of two years, b) a significant number of
irregular TCNs have been employed illegally, c) particularly
exploitative working conditions have been attested, and d)
the employer uses knowingly the services a victim of human
trafficking (Art. 10).
Furthermore, the pro-
posal would allow foreign
nationals to register com-
plaints and have protection
against exploitative working
conditions (Art. 14). Third
parties would be protected
when providing assistance
to lodge complaints if they
have been involved in any
facilitation of unauthorised
entry or residence. Additionally, those who cooperate in
proceedings should be entitled – such as the victims of
human trafficking who collaborate with the competent
authorities12 – to a short-term residence permit valid for at
least six months. As regards issues relating to outstanding
remunerations, taxes and social security contributions
presuming that a work relationship was of at least six
months duration, the claiming procedures should be
triggered automatically without the need for the TCN to
introduce a claim.13
Finally, the Commission proposal for a directive on
employer sanctions suggests that Member States would be
required to undertake a certain number of inspections
reaching at least 10% of their companies every year (Art.
15). The selection of the companies subject to control would
be based on a risk assessment analysis carried out by the
competent national bodies, taking into account the sector
in which a company operates and any past record of
infringement. Whether inspections will be linked to those
designed to detect breaches of health and safety law,
breaches of tax or customs regulations and other crimes is
still unknown at this stage.
An assessment on the proposal’s main provisions An assessment on the proposal’s main provisions An assessment on the proposal’s main provisions An assessment on the proposal’s main provisions An assessment on the proposal’s main provisions
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a) Legal basis Legal basis Legal basis Legal basis Legal basis
As already mentioned, the aim of this proposal is to cut
irregular immigration by stopping the irregular employment
of migrants through employ-
er sanctions. Even though
the Commission has been
criticised for not basing the
draft Directive on the labour
provisions of the EC Treaty,
the chosen legal basis of
Article 63(3)(b) is correct
because the principal focus
of the proposed legislation is neither on employment, nor
on working conditions.
(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) Irregularity of stay Irregularity of stay Irregularity of stay Irregularity of stay Irregularity of stay
The use of irregularity of stay of the TCN as the sole reason
for sanctions deliberately overlooks EU citizens and legal
TCN migrant workers who may also be subject to labour
exploitation. Irregular migrants are more vulnerable than
any other category as they are willing to accept any type of
work in order to survive and potential employers can exploit
their precarious situation.14
Illegal migration is a social fact that will always
characterise national markets due to the interplay between
supply and demand. On the one hand, demand for illegal
activity is determined by the tolerance of crime in the host
society. On the other, the supply of irregular migrants
depends on the expected
profit that can be obtained
from irregular migrants (e.g.
low wages, no payment of
taxes and social security
contributions, competitive
products etc). Consequently,
when expected returns from
irregular migration increase,
the number of irregular
migrants will also increase
because they become more
attractive to employers. In this context, the draft directive
tries to reduce the social costs of irregular migration by
approximating the form and range of sanctions across
Member States.
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) Financial sanctions and criminal offences Financial sanctions and criminal offences Financial sanctions and criminal offences Financial sanctions and criminal offences Financial sanctions and criminal offences
The activation of a range of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive penalties against employers of illegally staying
third-country nationals for all Member States should only
be seen as a legal alternative to reducing irregular migration.
As the ECJ has affirmed in many cases, the Commission
does not have competence to decide on the amount of fines
or types of penalties and therefore it does not aim to
harmonise substantive criminal law or rules of criminal
procedure.15
The table in Appendix clearly illustrates that at least 26
of the 27 Member States already have employer sanctions
and preventive measures in place and in 19 States there are
national provisions for criminal sanctions. One may notice,
however, that not only does the scope and scale of these
The supply of irregular
migrants depends on the
expected profit that can be
obtained from irregular
migrants.
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measures vary greatly, but also the enforcement. For
example, 4 Member States (Denmark, Luxembourg, Cyprus
and Ireland) do not have administrative fines in place; 10
Member States (Estonia, Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden)
do not foresee criminal sanctions, whereas in Denmark,
Poland, Czech Republic and Sweden the illegal employee
can also be fined. Administrative and criminal fines do not
apply together in Spain, whilst in Poland and Sweden fines
can be imposed per illegal worker or for the offence. Apart
from the Netherlands, differences in fines depend on the
type of the crime, the number of illegally employed workers
and the existence of aggravating circumstances. Aside
from Slovenia and Cyprus, preventive measures exist in all
other Member States. These may be summarised as
a) placing the responsibility on the employer to declare
new employees and verify their status;
b) encouraging employment of documented workers;
c) linking social security with written employment contracts;
d) raising awareness;
e) providing financial incentives for employers.
The existence of a common minimum level of sanctions
on employers will guarantee that all Member States apply
high sanctions and consequently that there would not be a
rise in illegal immigrants’ movements to Member States
with lower levels of sanctions.
Indeed, the higher the income difference between
receiving and sending countries, and the smaller the
probability of being detected and the severity of punishment,
the higher the number of illegal migrants tends to be.16 In
contrast, a higher degree of probability of detection in
combination with a lower degree of tolerance, negatively
affects the expected net gain from moving.17 If a company
runs a greater risk of being
detected due to the increase
in inspections and uniform
sanctions applying to the
whole EU, then the potential
utility losses will have to be
subtracted from potential
opportunities and wealth
gains. From an economic
approach, the expected loss depends both on the probability
of detection as well as the penalty. For example, frequent
authorisation checks makes employing illegal workers a
risky business and increasing sanctions will discourage
employers from employing TCNs without work permits as
the probability of detection becomes noticeable. Controls
and penalties are likely to be augmented if political pressure
and xenophobic interests, especially closer to national
elections, and in the presence of high unemployment rates,
leads politicians to target irregular migration.18
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness
The ultimate aim, however, to curb illegal immigration to
zero comes with additional costs. Preventing any migration
activity would be impractical as total control of the external
borders would be prohibitively costly. The optimal balance
between desirable and undesirable migration depends
upon governments’ decisions to either allocate public
resources for fighting illegal migration, or use them for
foreign aid and social services in the developing countries.19
Despite Member States’ consensus that combating illegal
work (in general and that of illegally staying TCNs in
particular) is a governmental priority, it appears that the
human resources allocated to monitoring are not sufficient
and therefore few controls are actually made.
In general, it is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of
measures and related sanctions. Nevertheless, if
administrative fines are small and the authorities’ checks
are not continuously carried out, sanctions will not contribute
to reducing the number of illegally employed TCNs.
Undeniably, administrative fines are an efficient measure
to fight illegal immigration since, on the one hand, it is a
form of inhibition for employers and immigrant manpower
abusers and, on the other, it is a source of compensatory
financial resources to bear the costs of the actions against
illegal immigration. However, these are not effective enough,
if they are not accompanied by other preventive measures.
Preventive actions are very important tools especially, when
focused on the roots of illegal immigration (e.g. poverty in
the home country) as well as on roots of preference of illegal
employment by employers.
(e) (e) (e) (e) (e) Enforcement issues Enforcement issues Enforcement issues Enforcement issues Enforcement issues
The Commission’s proposal for sanctions against employers
of irregular migrants does not remedy existing national
enforcement difficulties (e.g. lack of controls, strong
incentives for illegal employment etc). It can only provide
the legal framework for harmonised employer sanctions
and preventive measures and help to identify best practices
at the implementation stage.
The adoption of the proposed sanctions by Member
States is not in and of itself enough to guarantee that the
competitive and financial advantages of employing irregular
migrants will cease. Enforcing legislation on immigration
still remains a national responsibility, not a European one.
This is quite clear if one recalls that the European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum
invites Member States “to
control, amongst other tasks,
illegal immigration”.20 The
draft directive on employers’
sanctions should be seen as
part and parcel of this call.
Member States should be
the standard setters who
could request employers to notify cases of irregular presence
to the immigration authorities when checking documentation
of migrant workers and also decide the extent to which
workplace inspections could lead to repatriations.
However, there is a two-fold role for action at EU level:
1) to facilitate the exchange of good practice on the issues
mentioned below, and 2) to facilitate the exchange of
relevant information. Measures at EU level are also justified
in order to help ensure the effectiveness of the proposed
sanctions and to prevent any distortions of competition that
varying levels of enforcement could entail.
Other recommended measures Other recommended measures Other recommended measures Other recommended measures Other recommended measures
To better enforce the prohibition on employing irregular
TCNs, a set of additional measures should have be included
in the draft Directive as follows:
• Simplification of administrative formalities Simplification of administrative formalities Simplification of administrative formalities Simplification of administrative formalities Simplification of administrative formalities: Complicated
and bureaucratic processes in relation to immigration
and employment regulation do not drive employers to
act in the best interests of their migrant employees.
Clear, concise legislation and guidance as well as
Administrative fines are an
efficient measure to fight
illegal immigration.EIPASCOPE 2008/3
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uncomplicated procedures are essential to aid
compliance and reduce illegal working. The current
Commission proposal on the establishment of a single
work/residence permit21 which would contain biometric
identifiers is a good example of such a practice.
• Better coordination, exchange of information and Better coordination, exchange of information and Better coordination, exchange of information and Better coordination, exchange of information and Better coordination, exchange of information and
surveillance: surveillance: surveillance: surveillance: surveillance: Improvements in the resources, expertise
and control capacity of law enforcement authorities
(e.g. labour inspectorates, social security and tax
authorities), and in their cooperation with social partners
can contribute to reductions in the incentives to
undeclared work.
• Better co-operation with countries of origin and Better co-operation with countries of origin and Better co-operation with countries of origin and Better co-operation with countries of origin and Better co-operation with countries of origin and
establishment of a coherent common policy on establishment of a coherent common policy on establishment of a coherent common policy on establishment of a coherent common policy on establishment of a coherent common policy on
readmission and return readmission and return readmission and return readmission and return readmission and return.
• Mainstreaming migrant/diversity policy objectives: Mainstreaming migrant/diversity policy objectives: Mainstreaming migrant/diversity policy objectives: Mainstreaming migrant/diversity policy objectives: Mainstreaming migrant/diversity policy objectives:
provision of more and better information about migrant
workers’ rights and level of protection, and development
of varied models of service provision to match their
needs.
• Increasing awareness of sanctions Increasing awareness of sanctions Increasing awareness of sanctions Increasing awareness of sanctions Increasing awareness of sanctions in case of detection.
• Identifying and exchanging good practices Identifying and exchanging good practices Identifying and exchanging good practices Identifying and exchanging good practices Identifying and exchanging good practices with the aim
to assess:
1) systematic and large-scale illegal employment, 2) the
application of sanctions, 3) methods for regularising or
removing irregular TCNs by inspection and enforcement
processes, 4) the links between illegal employment of
TCNs without the right to work, 5) the right to reside and
the wider informal economy.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The draft directive on sanctions against employers of
illegally staying third-country nationals is a part of a firm
policy which aims to make the EU a less attractive destination.
It seeks to reduce the pull factor encouraging illegal
immigration into the EU by making it harder to find work.
However, these efforts will have to take into account the
hard reality that the employment of TCNs who are illegally
staying in the EU Member States will respond to the
dynamics of labour supply and demand. Consequently, the
higher the tolerance of the host society, the higher the
demand for irregular workers. Even though regularisation
allows better population management and tackles the
problem of illegal working, this article has suggested that
this practice should be avoided or used as a last resort as
it encourages forms of illegal migration.
The Commission’s legislative proposal minimises
national differences and brings added value by reducing
losses to Member States’ public finances, increasing labour
inspections, approximating penalties and sanctions against
employers in breach of legislation and decreasing
exploitation. Public perception which tends to create
xenophobic attitudes towards illegal immigrants was also
taken into account.
Certainly, any legislation providing for sanctions and
preventive measures would not of itself be sufficient to
address the problem. The effectiveness of measures in
place is highly dependent on the efforts and resources put
in place for enforcement. In addition, there is a need for
using a policy mix to crack down on irregular employment.
This policy mix should not only include stronger sanctions,
controls and better implementation of decisions, but also
address different kinds of incentives for recruiting illegal
immigrants.
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Legislation Legislation Legislation Legislation Legislation
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria
Employment of Aliens Law No. 218/1975
Work contract right adjustment law No.
459/1983
General social security law No. 189/
1955
Unemployment insurance law No. 609/
1977
Trade and Industrial Regulations No. 194/
1994
Income tax act No. 400/1988
2. 2. 2. 2. 2. Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium
Law of 15 December 1980 concerning
aliens
Draft law of 27 December 2006 on
employer sanctions (arts. 312-324)
3. 3. 3. 3. 3. Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark
Aliens Act 2001
4. 4. 4. 4. 4. Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia
Aliens Act 1993
5. 5. 5. 5. 5. Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg
Law of 28 March 1972 on the employ-
ment of foreign workers
The Law of 3 August 1977 on penal
sanctions
6. 6. 6. 6. 6. Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
Foreigners Act – 1990 (reforms in 1994,
1997, 2005)
Law on black work and other accom-
panying measures in 2004
Immigration Act – 2005 (replaced
Foreigners Act and introduced additional
offences for smuggling of human beings)
German tax code
7. 7. 7. 7. 7. Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece
Law No. 3386/2005 on entry, residence
and integration of TCNs
8. 8. 8. 8. 8. Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary
Act XXXIX of 2001 on the Entry and Stay of
Foreigners
9. 9. 9. 9. 9. Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy
Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002, known as
the “Bossi-Fini law” amended 40/98,
known as “Turco-Napolitano law”
Administrative Sanctions Administrative Sanctions Administrative Sanctions Administrative Sanctions Administrative Sanctions
Min.  €1,000 per worker;
Max. €50.000 p/w;
the amount depends on the number of
workers and previous conviction.
€3,750 p/w;
Employers hiring illegal workers can be
administratively fined.
—
Some possibility to expel an alien not
having a work permit.
Max: €1,150 for individuals;
Max: €3,195 for enterprises.
—
Max: €500,000 for the offence; German
law does not foresee sanctions against
individuals;
The amount of the fine depends on the
seriousness of the crime whereas personal
and financial status of the person are
taken into account.
€3,000-15,000 per worker;
it is forbidden to engage workers illegally;
responsibility to inform the competent
authority.
€1,940 p/TCN;
Administrative fine: approximately €390;
The costs of expulsion are born by the
employer;
Responsibility to report to the competent
authority before the work permits expires
(at least 5 working days).
€5,000 p/TCN;
Penal Sanctions Penal Sanctions Penal Sanctions Penal Sanctions Penal Sanctions
Fine amounts depend on the seriousness
of crime and repeat crime
Min. €1,000
Max: €50,00
Penal sanctions apply when organising
illegal employment of 10 persons
Min. 6 months;
Max: 5 year imprisonment.
Min. €15,000 p/w;
Fines btw €12,500-62,500 and/or
imprisonment: 8 days-1 year.
Criminal fine: €1,341 p/w per month;
€2,681 p/w per month (aggravating
circumstances)
Max. imprisonment illegal employee: 1
year
Max. imprisonment employer: 2 years.
—
Criminal fine;
In case of re-offending within within 5
years, imprisonment: 8 days – 6 months/
twice the max. fine.
Max. imprisonment for hiring 5 illegal
migrants: 1 year;
Max. imprisonment in aggravating
circumstances: 3 years.
Min. imprisonment: 3 months;
Max. imprisonment: 6 months (aggravat-
ing circumstances apply).
Max. 2 years of imprisonment depending
on tax revenue losses;
Increased criminal sanctions if there is
trafficking, enslaving or minors trafficking.
Violation by employment agent:
Max. imprisonment: 6 months;
Min. fine: €1,500;
Max. fine: €7,500
Imprisonment: min. 3 months; max.: 1
year;
Fine: €5,000 p/w;Criminal sanctions are
increased in case of human trafficking.
Preventive measures Preventive measures Preventive measures Preventive measures Preventive measures
Some regions (e.g. Kernten) have an
explicit requirement to verify status of
workers.
Since 2003, employers must declare
employees to the social security
administration.
Compulsory registration of all employees
with the competent authorities from their
first working day.
In case of short-term employment, the
employer has to register the worker with
the Citizenship and Migration Board;
Registration of short-term employment is
free of charge and takes only 10 days.
The Grand-Ducal regulation of 4 Novem-
ber 1994 foresees the communication of
a certificate to the Labour Inspectorate
before the work begins*.
Implicit so far requirement for the
employers to check residence and work
permit status of foreigners;
In further amendments of the legislation,
it will become an explicit obligation.
Employers must pay their own and the
employees social security contributions
and check that the documentation is
submitted to the social insurance
organisations;
Since 2005, every foreign worker has to
declare to the regional authorities every
change of the employment status.
Since 2004, all employers must register
new employees with the new Unified
Labour Register (so-called EMMA);
Internet access to the register is available.
The employer who hires a TCN must
verify that this person holds a regular
residence permit qualifying him/her to
work;The system does not provide for a
work permit.
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10. 10. 10. 10. 10.The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands The Netherlands
The Aliens Employment Act 2000 (WAV)
11. 11. 11. 11. 11.Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland
Regulation issued by the Minister of Labour
and Social Policy (19 December 2001) on
the performance of work by foreign
persons with no need to obtain work
permit;
Aliens Act of 13 June 2003 Regulation
issued by the Minister of Labour and
Social Policy (21 July 2006) on the mode
and conditions of issuing work permits
for foreigners
12. 12. 12. 12. 12.Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal
Decree Law No 244/98 modified by Dec.-
law No 34/2003
13. 13. 13. 13. 13.Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain
Ley Orgánica 10/1995 modified by Ley
Orgánica 4/2000 on the rights, liberties
and social integration of foreigners
14. 14. 14. 14. 14.United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
Immigration Act 1971
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act
1996
Asylum and Immigration Act 2002
Asylum and Immigration Act 2006 (came
into force in 2008)
15. 15. 15. 15. 15.Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic
Act No. 435/2004 Coll., on Employment
(Act on Employment)
16. 16. 16. 16. 16.France France France France France
1974: Creation of an interministerial
institution for the fight against human
trafficking (MILUTMO)
1997: Replaced by an interministerial
delegation for the fight against illegal
work (DILTI)
Law 2006-911 (24 June 2006 on
immigration and integration)
17. 17. 17. 17. 17.Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia
Labour Law (December 2002 as amended
in January and April 2004)
Cabinet Regulation No. 44 (20 January
2004) regarding work permits for aliens
18. 18. 18. 18. 18.Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia
Act No. 95/2000 Coll. on Labour
Inspection replaced by Act No. 82/2005
Coll. on Illegal Work and Illegal
Employment and on amendment of
certain acts as amended by the Act No.
125/2006 Coll. on Labour Inspection
€4,000 p/ TCN for individuals;
€8,000 p/TCN for legal entities;
Since January 2005, there is also a
possibility for imposing an administrative
penalty.
Unclear if fine is imposed per illegal
worker or for the offence;
Obligation to incur the costs of expulsion.
€2,000-27,500 p/ TCN;
The third contracting party is also liable;
Public Administrations are liable of
disciplinary procedures;
Fine is reduced to half if the infraction was
pursued with mere negligence; the attempt
is not punishable.
Min: €6,000 p/w;
Max: €60,000 p/w.
A civil penalty system for employers was
introduced on 29 February 2008)
Min: £1,250 p/ TCN;
Max: £10,000 p/TCN;
Prosecutions are dealt with in the local
magistrates’ court.
Max: €85,000 for the offence;
The illegal employee is also fined – max:
€422.
As of July 2006 min. 1000 times minimum
hourly wage for the offence;
Max: 5000 times minimum hourly wage
for the offence;
Max: €150,000 for legal entities as a
single fine.
€140-700 for the offence for individuals;
€700-14,000 for enterprises.
Max: €33,000 for the offence on legal
entity or a natural person.
Minimum sanctions are not applied;
Max. fine: €67,000;
Max. imprisonment: 1 year;
Aggravated circumstances:
Max. 3 years imprisonment;
Refusal of profession or public service.
Min. fine: €937;
Max. fine: €1,561;
Aggravating circumstances apply;
Recklessness and negligence are sufficient
to establish criminal behaviour;
Undeclared workers are also fined: €156;
Irregular workers are sentenced too:
€312.
—
Administrative and penal fines do not
apply together;
Min. Fine: 6 months
Max.: 1 year
Min. imprisonment: 2 years
Max.: 5 years.
Statutory max. fine £5,000 p/w in a
Magistrates/Sheriff Court;
Unlimited fine in a Crown Court;
In a Magistrates Court for England&
Wales, min. imprisonment: hours-1 day;
Max: 6 months;
For Scotland & N. Ireland, min. imprison-
ment: hours-1 day;
Max. 3 months.
—
For violation by employer:
Max. 5 years of imprisonment and/or
€15,000 p/w;
For violation by organised gangs: Max.
10 years of imprisonment and/or
€100,000 p/w;
Confiscation of employers’ goods.
Fine: 50-100 min. wages;
Community service;
Confiscation of employers’ goods;
Imprisonment: 1-5 years;
Negligence is sufficient to establish
criminal behaviour.
—
Employer obligation by law to verify in
advance the labour market status of the
employee.
With some exceptions, work permit is
granted on the basis of legal employment.
The employer has to check if the foreign
citizen he/she wants to hire holds
residence, permanence permits or
working visa.
Companies should communicate inform-
ation on new employees with the Public
Employment Office;
No evaluation if this works or not.
There is some verification service for
employers where an applicant may have
difficulty in demonstrating his right to
work in the UK.
Employers have to announce the day
when TCN starts work and all other
relevant changes to activity the to local
Labour Office in written form;
They have to keep a record of all foreign
employees.
Since 1993, compulsory declaration of
the employee to the social security  body
before work starts.
There is no obligation for immediate
declaration; yet, there has to be a declared
vacancy;
The employer has to submit to the State
Employment Agency for approval a work
invitation for TCN.
The employer is obliged to report
immediately the employee to the register
of insured persons of Social Insurance
Company;
It has not been realised.EIPASCOPE 2008/3
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Source: Table compiled by the author supplementing the table produced by the European Commission in its "Accompany-
ing document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against
employers of illegally staying-third country nationals" SEC(2007) 603
* This obligation applies to where the presumed duration of the works is longer than 30 working days and more than 20 workers
are employed, or where the number of workers is more than 500 per day;
** European Training Corporation;
*** Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment.
19. 19. 19. 19. 19.Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria
Law on Foreigners (as amended in 2002)
20. 20. 20. 20. 20.Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania
Romanian Law No. 203/99 on work
permits;
Ordinance (GEO) No. 194/2002 on the
regime of aliens;
Romanian Law No. 53/2003 (the Labour
Code);
Government  Emergency Ordinance
(GEO) No. 55/2006
21. 21. 21. 21. 21.Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus
N/A
22. 22. 22. 22. 22.         Malta Malta Malta Malta Malta
Employment and Training Services Act
(1990)
23. 23. 23. 23. 23.Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania
Code of Administrative Violations of Law
(2004)
24. 24. 24. 24. 24.Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia
Law on the Prevention of Black Work and
Employment (LPBWE- 2000)
25. 25. 25. 25. 25.Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
Aliens Act (1990 as amended in 1997)
26. 26. 26. 26. 26.Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland
Aliens Act 1991
27. 27. 27. 27. 27.Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland
Employment Permits Act 2003 (as
amended in 2006)
€250-2,500 approximately p/w for indivi-
duals;
€10,000 p/w for legal entities;
In case of recommitment €5,000 approxi-
mately for individuals and €20,000 for
legal entities.
Not special sanctions in the GEO No.
194/2002;
€590-880 for the offence;
Employer, individual or legal entity, shall
be bound to bear the expenses for the
removal of the illegal alien;
The facilitation of illegal stay is considered
a minor offence and shall be sanctioned
with fine;
No contract:
Min: €440-590;
Max: €29,410;
No work permit: Fine: €1,470-2,940.
—
Min: €117
Max: €1,164
On payment of the fine, the employer is
compelled to complete the ECT engage-
ment form.
First time offence:
Min: €870 p/TCN
Max: €2,900 p/ TCN
Repeated offence:
Min: €2,900 p/TCN
Max: €5,800 p/ TCN.
Min: €212 for the offence
Max: €21,200.
Unclear if fine is imposed per illegal
worker or for the offence;
Fine can also be imposed on the
employee.
Min: €1,500 for the offence;
Max: €15,000 for the offence according
to its seriousness;
Violation of the Collective Agreement Act
is also sanctioned.
—
—
Major offence is the facilitation of illegal
stay of aliens implies a social risk;
Min. imprisonment: 6 months;
Max. 5 years;
In aggravating circumstances: imprison-
ment ranges btw 2-8 years;
In case of provoking the death of the
alien: imprisonment ranges btw 3-15
years;
In case of organised gangs, max.
imprisonment 18 years;
Criminal fines also apply for legal entities.
—
—
—
—
—
Criminal fine or imprisonment;
Max.: 1 or 4 years imprisonment if offence
is aggravated;
Employer may also be sentenced to forfeit
the proceeds of the crime and compensate
damage.
Min. fine: unclear
Max. €3,000/€250,000 depending on
contravention/conviction on indictment;
Min. imprisonment: 12 months
Max.: 10 years.
Submission of notice within 3 days from
the conclusion of the contract to the
National Agency on Revenues.
In case of bilateral agreements with TCs,
the employers mush inform the Authority
for Aliens within 5 days from the entry of
those aliens;
Aliens not having a work permit must
register themselves to the Labour Force
Migration Office (OLFM) within 30 days
from the date they begun their activity;
OLFM and the Authority of Aliens carries
out for the period 2007-2010 a raising
awareness campaign about the legal
provisions on aliens regime.
—
Employers are obliged to submit
engagement and termination forms to
the ECT** when recruiting or releasing
employees.
Employer’s duty to inform the social
security body in 1 day period about every
new employee;
—
Concerted efforts to raise social awareness
of undeclared work taken by the tax
authorities, branch organisations and
trade unions.
Compulsory registration with the
Employment Office and provision of
information of the applicable collective
agreement.
New employees must be in possession of
a valid work permit issued by the
D.E.T.E***; status and terms of employ-
ment are mentioned.
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